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UNITED STATES v. ARMSTRONG
48 E3d 1508 (9th Cir. 1995)
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
FACTS
In Armstrong I,I the United States appealed the dis-
missal of indictments against defendants Christopher
Armstrong, Aaron Hampton, Freddie Mack, Shelton
Martin, and Robert Rozelle. The indictments were dis-
missed as a sanction for the United States' failure to com-
ply with a discovery order issued by District Court Judge
Consuelo Bland Marshall. In April 1992, the defendants
were charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine base
(commonly known as "crack") a federal offense in viola-
tion of 21 U.S.C. §846. Some of the defendants were
also charged with selling cocaine base under 21 U.S.C.
§841(a)(1) and using firearms in connection with drug
trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. §924 (c).
The charges against the defendants resulted from
an investigation by a joint task force of detectives from
the Inglewood Narcotics Division and agents from the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF). The
investigation led to the subsequent arrest of defendants
for possessing close to 135 grams of cocaine base and
multiple firearms.
Defendants Martin, Armstrong and the other three
defendants sought discovery and / or a dismissal of the
indictments for selective prosecution, alleging that they
were prosecuted in federal court because of their race To
support the motion of discovery in the federal district court,
the defendants offered a survey by the Federal Public
Defender's office showing that in every case prosecuted
under Sections 841 and 846, the defendants were black.
The United States was unable to provide an explanation
for the disparity in the numbers, but insisted that there
was no racial motivation in the charging decisions. The
district court disagreed and granted the defendants' mo-
tion for discovery, ordering the United States to:
(1) provide a list of all cases from the prior three
years in which the government charged both co-
caine base offenses and firearm offenses; (2) iden-
tify the race of the defendants in those cases; (3)
identify whether state, federal, or joint law enforce-
ment authorities investigated each case; and (4)
explain the criteria used by the U.S. Attorney's Of-
fice for deciding whether to bring cocaine base cases
to the federal court.
2
121 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir. 1994).
2 United States v. Armstrong, 48 F.3d 1508, 1511 (9th Cir.
1995) [hereinafter "Armstrong II"].
The United States filed a motion for reconsidera-
tion of the discovery order. In support of its motion, the
United States provided a list of all defendants charged
with violation of Sections 841 and 846 over a three year
period without any racial breakdown. The United States
also provided declarations by three law enforcement of-
ficers and two Assistant United States Attorneys, who
collectively gave four explanations for the racial dispar-
ity in the government's charging decisions:
(1) Socio-economic factors result in more racial
groups being involved in the distribution of certain
drugs and blacks are the most active in the Los-
Angeles crack area; (2) over a three-year period
seven non-black, but racial minority defendants were
prosecuted on federal cocaine base charges; (3) many
blacks have been tried in state court for cocaine base
offenses; and (4) the factors used by federal pros-
ecutors to base their charging decisions are uniden-
tified "race-neutral" criteria.'
In support of the district court's discovery decision,
the defendants added to their original statistical study
by submitting additional declarations and an article from
the Los Angeles Times. One of the declarations was from
a halfway house intake coordinator, who reported that
in his experience whites and blacks dealt and used co-
caine base in equal numbers. In a separate declaration, a
defense attorney stated that in his experience many non-
blacks were prosecuted for cocaine base offenses in state
court.
4
District Court Judge Consuelo Bland Marshall de-
nied the motion for reconsideration, holding that be-
cause the statistical data raised a question about the
motivation of the government, the United States must
disdose its criteria for the charging decision. The United
States refused to comply with the discovery order and
the defendants moved for dismissal of the indictments
as a sanction for the violation of the discovery order.
The district court dismissed the indictments, but stayed
the order pending appeal.The government appealed the
district court's decision to dismiss the indictments as a
sanction for the government's failure to obey the dis-
covery order.
3Id.
4 Id. at 1512.
The Ninth Circuit held inArmstronglthat the proper
standard to obtain discovery in a selective prosecution
claim was the "colorable basis" standard as articulated in
United States v. Bourgeois. 5 Bourgeois held that "a defen-
dant must present specific facts, not mere allegations,
establish a colorable basis for the existence of both dis-
criminatory application of a law and discriminatory in-
tent on the part of the government."6 Armstrong I was
reviewed en banc by the Ninth Circuit in Armstrong 1I.7
HOLDING
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed en
banc the district court's dismissal of the indictments.
Although the court adopted the Bourgeois colorable
basis standard, the court emphasized that the thresh-
old for discovery is much lower than the colorable
basis standard applied in Bourgeois. The court ex-
pressly overruled United States v. Guiterrez,9 which
had held that statistical disparity alone does not sat-
isfy the discriminatory effect prong of a prima fade
showing of selective prosecution. 10 The Armstrong II
court held that because the threshold showing for dis-
covery is less than that for a prima fade case, then
"inadequately explained evidence of a significant sta-
tistical disparity suffices to show the colorable basis
of discriminatory intent and effect which warrants
discovery on a selective prosecution claim.""
ANALYSIS/ APPLICATION
The court in Armstrong II resolved a conflict within
the the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals between two
cases that adopted different approaches to the thresh-
old discovery showing required of a defendant in a se-
lective prosecution claim. Both United States v. Redondo-
Lemosl2 and Bourgeois follow United States v. Wayte.
13
Wayte held that selective prosecution claims should be
reviewed according to ordinary equal protection stan-
dards,14 and required a petitioner to show both discrimi-
natory effect and motive. 5 Bourgeois noted that Wayte
did not establish a discovery threshold. 6
In dictum, the Redondo- Lemos court suggested that
in selective prosecution claims, the defendant must
5 964 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1992).
6 United States v. Bourgeois, 964 F.2d 935, 939 (9th Cir.
1992).
748 F.3d 1508 (9th Cir. 1995).
s 964 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1992).
s 990 F.2d 472 (9th Cir. 1993).
10 Armstrong I, 48 F.3d 1514 C1995).
" Id. at 1513.
12 955 F.2d 1296 (9th Cir. 1992).
13 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
'4 Id. at 608.
'1 Id. at 608-609.
16 Bourgeois, 964 F.2d at 939.
present enough evidence to demonstrate a reasonable
inference of discriminatory treatment. 7 The court in
Redondo-Lemos held that in order to establish pur-
poseful discrimination, the district court may find an
intent to discriminate on the part of the prosecutor
on the basis of its own day-to-day observations.' If
the defendant raises the claim of selective prosecu-
tion, enough evidence must be presented to demon-
strate a reasonable inference of-discriminatory in-
tent. 9 Once a showing of discriminatory effect has
been made, the United States must be given an op-
portunity to present evidence to rebut the prima fa-
de case.20 This evidence consists of "overall case sta-
tistics" which both the district court and the defen-
dant might reasonably understand and analyze.
2' If
the district court finds by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the prosecutor's charging or plea bargain-
ing practice has a discriminatory impact, it must de-
termine whether the prosecution was motivated by a
discriminatory purpose.22 At this point, an in camera
review of certain prosecution files and limited dis-
covery by the defendant might be allowed, 23 but such
an examination is only to be conducted in extraordi-
nary situations and only when the district court has
serious doubts about whether the prosecutorial deci-
sions are being made in a discriminatory fashion. 4
Finally, the Redondo-Lemos court held that if the dis-
trict court finds by a preponderance of the evidence
that there has been intentional discrimination on the
basis of a race or sex, then it may fashion the appro-
priate remedy.
25
In Bourgeois, the defendant raised the issue of selec-
tive prosecution. The court held that a defendant must
"present specific facts, not mere allegations, which es-
tablish a colorable basis for the existence of both dis-
criminatory application of a law and discriminatory in-
tent on the part of government actors."26 The court ex-
plicitly stated that this standard contained a high thresh-
old.27 However, the Bourgeois court held that the
"colorable basis" standard for discovery should not be so
high as to require establishment of a prima facie case.
28
The preliminary issue before the Ninth Circuit in
Armstrong I was whether the Redondo-Lemos "reason-
able inference "showing or the Bourgeois "colorable ba-












28 Bourgeois, 964 F.2d 939 (1992).The First, Second, Fifth,
and Eighth Circuits have adopted the "prima fade showing"
sis" showing was the appropriate standard in determin-
ing when a defendant has made a proper showing to
obtain discovery in a selective prosecution claim. The
Ninth Circuit's holding in Armstrong 129 resulted in the
court adopting Bourgeois' colorable basis standard.30 The
Armstrong I court admitted that neither test was "easily
susceptible to further definition,"31 but determined that
the colorable basis test of Bourgeois was more aligned
with the facts in Armstrong L31 In both Bourgeois and
Armstrong, the defendants were challenging their pros-
ecutions, while in Redondo-Lemos the judge granted dis-
covery based on his own suspicions.The ArmstrongI court
held that "Bourgeois is the law of [the Ninth Circuit]
regarding the test for determining whether to grant a
defendant's motion for discovery on a selective prosecu-
tion claim.
3
The Ninth Circuit agreed to rehear Armstrong I en
banc, in order to clarify the meaning of the "colorable
basis" standard. The court rejected Bourgeois' "high
threshold" characterization of the colorable basis stan-
dard.34 The ArmstrongII court held that the'"high thresh-
old" language appears to set an artificially onerous bur-
den on selective prosecution discovery daims.35 The court
stressed that such a reading of the colorable basis stan-
dard was erroneous and that the threshold is not as 'high"
as the language in Bourgeois.
36
Second, the court recognized that Bourgeois did not
adequately explain the proper showing needed under
the colorable basis threshold to prove that prosecutorial
conduct has a discriminatory effect and is motivated by
a discriminatory purpose.37 In order for a defendant to
succeed on a claim of selective prosecution, the defen-
dant must show that the prosecutor's selection "had a
discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a dis-
criminatory purpos' 38 The Armstrongll court stated that
a direct showing of discriminatory intent is not always
necessary to prove a claim, and that in some situations a
circumstantial showing of intent may be used.39
Armstrong 11 found that"a circumstantial showing of in-
threshold to discovery. Under this doctrine the defendants must
establish a primafacie case of selective prosecution before dis-
covery of materials requested in connection with the claim
can be compelled. United States v. Parham, 16 F.3d 844 (8th
Cir. 1994). If the defendant fails to establish a primafacie show-
ing, the prosecution is presumed to be constitutionally valid
and undertaken in good faith. Id. at 846. In order for a defen-
dant to make a prima facie showing of selective prosecution,
the defendant must show; (1) that he has been singled out for
prosecution while others similarly situated have not been pros-
ecuted for similar conduct and (2) that the government's ac-
tion in thus singling him out was based on an impermissible
motive such as race, religion, or the exercise of constitutional
rights. Id.
29 21 E3d 1431 (9th Cir. 1994).
30 Armstrong I, 21 F.3d at 1436.
31 Id.
32 Id.
tent may be based on evidence of discriminatory ef-
fects,"40 and held that in some situations statistical dis-
parities alone were sufficient to provide evidence of dis-
criminatory effect and intent.41 This holding expressly
overrules Guirerrez. The court'in Armstrong II concluded
that "inadequately explained evidence of a significant
statistical disparity in the race of those prosecuted suf-
fices to show the colorable basis of discriminatory in-
tent and effect that warrants discovery on a selective
prosecution claim."
42
Finally, the Armstrong If court recognized that Bour-
geois did not adequately emphasize the evidentiary prob-
lems that the defendants face in attempting to prove a
colorable basis claim of selective prosecution. 43 The court
advised district court judges who are considering a dis-
covery request to seriously consider the evidentiary ob-
stacles defendants face.44 Due to the broad discretion
afforded to prosecutors in their charging decisions, it is
entirely possible that the prosecutors possess the only
information that would prove discrimination.
45
Defendants attempting to make a colorable basis
showing of selective prosecution are expected only to
put forth evidence that is already in their possession or
to make "good faith" efforts to obtain readily available
evidence.46 Defendants are not required to present so-
phisticated analyses or to compile facts which are not
easily obtainable by them. 7 The court concluded that
the colorable basis standard "ensures that the govern-
mert will not be called to answer for its charging deci-
sions as a result of frivolous and unwarranted allega-
tions."48 The court found that the colorable basis stan-
dard provides the government with sufficient protec-
tion against judicial scrutiny of their charging decisions.
'At the same time, the standard ensures that defendants
will not face unjustified hurdles at the discovery stage
that will predude them from demonstrating the exist-
ence of actual discrimination in the selection of defen-
dants for criminal prosecution."49
331d. at 1436.









42 Id. at 1513 - 1514.





48 Id. at 1515.
49 Id.
Applying the Bourgeois "colorable basis" test, the
Armstrong II court found that the "defendants have pre-
sented sufficient evidence to provide a colorable basis
for believing that the government has engaged in dis-
criminatory prosecution."s The court also found that
the defendant's statistical evidence, based on a study
conducted by the Federal Public Defender's office and
which suggested that blacks are disproportionately
charged with federal crack offense combined with the
United States' inability to offer sufficient evidence to
refute the inference in response, was sufficient for the
district judge in her discretion to determine that a
colorable basis for selective prosecution had been
shown.5
The court distinguished the study conducted by the
Federal Public Defender from the evidence used by the
defendants in Bourgeois.52 In Bourgeois, the defendants
had argued that they were entitled to discovery based
on a showing that all prosecutions for firearm violations
resulting from a two-day police operation involved only
black defendants. s3 The district court rejected these
claims on the theory that two days was too short of time
to serve as a basis for showing discriminatory intent and
effect.s4 In contrast, the Federal Public Defender study
presented by the defendants in Armstrong, involved an
agency that represents a significant percentage of all fed-
eral defendants and covered a significant period of time ss
Such a study "provides a much stronger basis for reason-
ably inferring invidious discrimination than does an
analysis of only a single, short police operation."
5 6
The court cautioned district courts to afford the
United States an opportunity to explain the evidence
offered by the defendant.5 7 'A colorable basis must still
exist after all the evidence presented by both sides has
been considered."I s The court found that two declara-
tions from defense attorneys provided additional sup-
port for the defendant's allegations that the prosecutor's
charging decisions were discriminatory 9
Judge Wallace concurred in the judgment of the
court, but was concerned about the majority's attempts
to "clarify" the test stated in Bourgeois.6°Judge Wallace
agreed with the majority's rejection of the "high thresh-
old" requirement of Bourgeois,"' but disagreed that the
standard was as "low" as a nonfrivolous showing.6Judge






5 Id. at 1516.
s1 Id. at 1517.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 1518.
60 Id. at 1520 (Wallace, J., concurring in the judgment).
61 Id. (Wallace, J., concurring in the judgment).
Wallace also disagreed with the majority's conclusion
that statistical evidence might be sufficient to prove dis-
criminatory effect and intent.61 Judge Wallace conceded,
however, that at the discovery stage, where there is
enough data over a sufficient amount of time, such evi-
dence is sufficient to establish a colorable basis claim for
selective prosecution.r4
Judge Wallace pointed out that the role of the ap-
pellate court is not to second-guess the trial court, but
to ask whether the district court abused its
discretion.65Unless. the district court clearly abused its
discretion in ordering discovery and dismissing the in-
dictments, the judgment of the lower court should not
be overturned on appeal. He found that in this case, the
defendants provided sufficient evidence to support the
district court's order and that therefore the lower court's
decision should be affirmed.
Judge Rymer, along with Judges Leavy, Nelson, and
Kleinfeld dissented.66 They argued that a colorable basis
had not been established.67 To show a colorable basis,
the dissent asserted that the defendants must: (1) draw
a reference to a comparison group, and (2) provide evi-
dence that others, similarly situated except for their race,
have not been prosecuted.68 Judge Rymer asserted that
the majority's opinion actually "guts Bourgeois by hold-
ing that when a selective prosecution claim is based on
race, evidence tending to show that only members of
racial or ethnic minority groups have been prosecuted
will suffice."OJudge Rymer argued that "the proper legal
standard is not whether the defendant's evidence raises
a question, but whether it provides a colorable basis for
the existence of discriminatory effect and discrimina-
tory intent."0 In the absence of any evidence that the
government purposefully selected these defendants for
prosecution on account of their race, there is no colorable
basis for the existence of discriminatory intent as a mat-
ter of law.
71
The dissent asserted that at the discovery stage, it is
the defendant's burden to provide facts that would prove
both discriminatory intent and effect. 72 The dissent com-
plained that the district court erred in two respects: (1)
it shifts to the government the responsibility to dissuade
public opinion, but ignored the government's submis-
sions, and (2) the discovery ordered will not show who
61 Id. (Wallace, J., concurring in the judgment).
61 Id. at 1521 (Wallace, J., concurring in the judgment).
61 Id. (Wallace, J., concurring in the judgment).
65 Id. (Wallace, J., concurring in the judgment).
" Id. (Rymer, J., dissenting).
67 Id. at 1522 (Rymer, J., dissenting).
68 Id. (Rymer, J., dissenting).
6 Id. at 1524 (Rymer, J., dissenting).
70 Id. (Rymer, J., dissenting).
71 id.
72 Id.
was not prosecuted, but only those defendants that were
prosecuted.73
Additionally, the dissent argued that both the Su-
preme Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
have clearly distinguished between discriminatory effect
and intent, thus recognizing them as two distinct ele-
ments.74 The dissent argued that "the majority's opinion
effectively collapses intent into effect by holding that
both must be shown by the same, insubstantial statis-
tic."75
The dissent objected most vigorously to the
majority's removal of the "high threshold" standard of
Bourgeois.76 Judge Rymer argued that "a high threshold
will discourage fishing expeditions, protect legitimate
prosecutoral discretion, safeguard government investi-
gative records, and yet still allow meritorious claims to
proceed."T'Judge Rymer argued that lowering the thresh-
old requirement will allow frivolous claims against law
enforcement to flourish78 and that a "high threshold" is
necessary because courts are ill equipped to evaluate a
prosecutor's charging decision. 9 In essence, Judge Rymer
warned that allowing such claims could result in a sepa-
ration of powers issue. Judge Rymer also characterized
the majority's attempts to clarify the "colorable basis"
standard as crafting a "new standard which is far more
elusive than Bourgeois."°
CONCLUSION
Other circuits have adopted their own tests to de-
termine whether or not a defendant is allowed discov-
ery in a selective prosecution claim. The Third, Sixth,
7 Id. (Rymer, J., dissenting).
14 Id. at 1522 (Rymer, J., dissenting).
7s Id. (Rymer, J., dissenting).
76 Id. at 1526 (Rymer, J., dissenting).
71 Id. (Rymer, J., dissenting).
78 Id. (Rymer, J., dissenting).
79 Id. (Rymer, J., dissenting).
10 Id. at 1526 (Rymer, J., dissenting).
81 cite proposition from these circuits
Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits have also
adopted the "colorable basis" standard for discovery in
selective prosecution claims. In these circuits, the
colorable basis standard is met by "some evidence tend-
ing to show the essential elements of the claim....,s8
"[S] ome evidence" means the showing must be more
than frivolous and based on more than conclusory alle-
gations. 2 The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits, on the other
hand, have adopted the "nonfrivolous/ legitimate issue"
threshold for discovery in selective prosecution cases.
This standard requires a defendant to present "sufficient
evidence to establish a 'colorable entitlement' for a se-
lective prosecution claim or sufficient facts 'to take the
question past the frivolous state and raise a reasonable
doubt as to the prosecutor's purpose."83 There is some
uncertainty in the circuits applying the colorable basis
standard about where the nonfrivolous! legitimate-is-
sue threshold lies in the discovery continuum. The Sev-
enth Circuit has lumped both the frivolous/legitimate-
issue threshold with the prima facie threshold and criti-
cized both as being too high.
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to
ArmstrongI.84 Thus the status of the colorable basis stan-
dard as articulated in Arnstrong II is uncertain. The dis-
agreement between the majority of the Ninth Circuit
who want to protect against discriminatory enforcement
of the laws, and the dissent who want to protect the law
enforcement from frivolous selective prosecution claims
will eventually be resolved by the High Court.
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
Kimkea Harris
82 Armstrong l, 48 F.3d at 1512, (quoting United States v.
Heidecke, 900 F.2d 1155, 1159 (7th Cir. 1990)(emphasis is
original)).
m United States v. Gordon, 817 E2d 1538, 1540 (11th
Cir. 1988) (citing United States v. Hazel, 696 F.2d 473, 475
(6th Cir. 1983) (quoting United States v. Larson, 612 F.2d 1301,
1304-05 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936 (1980).
1w United States v.Arnstrong, 48 E3d 1508 (9th Cir. 1995),
cert. granted, 116 S.Ct. 377 (1995).
